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Abstract 
 
We investigated the role automated behavior plays in 
contributing to security breaches.  Using different 
forms of phishing, combined with multiple 
neurophysiological tools, we were able to more fully 
understand the approaches participants took when 
they engaged with a phishing campaign. The four 
participants of this pilot study ranged in their 
individual characteristics of gender and IT 
experience while controlling for age.  It seems the 
biggest factor for awareness and successfully 
resisting a phishing campaign may be proximity of 
security training to engagement with that campaign.  
Neurophysiological tools helped illustrate the 
thought processes behind participants’ statements 
and actions; combined with consideration of 
individual characteristics, these tools help shed more 
light on human behavior.  In the future, we plan to 
further enhance our testing environment by 
incorporating an emergent model that considers 
work task complexity and incorporate more industry 
participants with a range of IT experience.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Samantha needed to work on a large file at home. 
It was too big to email, so she absent-mindedly 
plugged a flash drive someone had left in the break 
room into her desktop’s USB port. This was not an 
issue for her since she had used the flash drive plenty 
of times in the past. She had logged on with her 
password, and the company’s email client was open. 
This simple act started a chain reaction, launching 
malware hidden on the flash drive that propagated by 
attaching a copy of the malignant code to every email 
she sent. Within hours, the corporate network was 
thoroughly compromised. 
The above hypothetical vignette illustrates an 
important insight that eludes many Information 
Technology (IT) managers tasked with cybersecurity: 
many breaches occur when users are not consciously 
aware of what they are doing. Also, contrary to recent 
headlines, not all threats in the cyber realm are 
malicious in nature. According to a Ponemon study, 
70% of US survey respondents and 64% of German 
respondents stated that more security incidents were 
caused by unintentional mistakes rather than 
malicious acts [1]. This is happening in an era when 
we have clear organizational guidelines pertaining to 
mandatory Security Education, Training, and 
Awareness (SETA) programs. We contend that most 
of these unintentional mistakes are due to habitual 
behavior that promotes an automatic response. This 
response may vary based on the experience of 
individuals.  
Previous research supports the idea that 
automated behavior results from the force of habit [2-
4]. It is a given that understanding and linking these 
automated behaviors more clearly to design features 
may be highly valuable. But, it is also important to 
investigate the role a person’s experience may play in 
promoting automated behavior. Can the behavior of a 
novice and an expert be visualized and compared in a 
cybersecurity context? This issue needs to be 
developed for any meaningful modeling and 
advancement in SETA programs. It is also important 
to investigate the efficacy of training based on 
individual groups. Does one-size-fits-all training 
really work? Interestingly, traditional research in 
human computer interaction has examined the design 
and usability components of technology as intended 
rather than the use/impact cycle [5]. However, by 
under-emphasizing the use/impact cycle of 
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technology, researchers have predominantly ignored 
the impact that automated behavior may have.   
The purpose of our study was to gauge user 
behavior by visualizing the brains of users of varied 
technical experiences in the context of potential 
phishing attacks. We designed and executed an 
experiment in which participants were tasked with 
work-related exercises while being monitored and 
connected to a suite of neurophysiological tools (e.g., 
electroencephalography [EEG], eye tracking, and 
facial encoding of emotion by web camera). 
In this paper, we present the results of our pilot 
study using neurophysiological tools to gain a more 
complete understanding of human behavior in a work 
context while individuals interacted with emails 
covertly staged as a phishing attack.  The next section 
provides the motivation and basis of our argument 
that unintentional mistakes are due to automated 
behavior, which may be due to individual differences 
in experience.  We report the results of our EEG 
analysis and provide examples of the additional 
neurophysiological data collected. We also present an 
emergent model that we plan to integrate with what 
we have already done as part of our future research. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of incorporating 
neurophysiological tools into security research to 
improve SETA programs. 
 
2. Martin-Morich Model of Consumer 
Behavior Adapted to Cybersecurity 
 
Compelling research from diverse fields including 
neuroscience, cognitive, social and behavioral 
psychology, and behavioral economics, reveals that 
most human behavior is predominantly the result of 
unconscious mental processes. When a person is in a 
familiar situation doing repetitive tasks, behavior 
rapidly becomes automatic, not open to conscious 
control. This research challenges the conventional 
wisdom embedded in most models of human 
behavior that posit humans are rational agents 
making conscious decisions.  
The impact of these research streams to 
cybersecurity is profound. At the core of all 
cybersecurity assumptions is that users are capable of 
following directions that require conscious attention 
to behaviors performed in highly habitual settings. 
From this perspective, it seems logical to assume that 
explaining cybersecurity policies to users should be 
sufficient to obtain compliance. Yet, a high 
percentage of cybersecurity breaches are caused by 
unconscious user behavior, which is immune to all 
appeals that rely on conscious mind attention and 
control. Similar to other recent work in IS [6], we 
propose adapting the Martin-Morich model of 
consumer behavior (shown in Figure 1) to develop an 
improved approach to cybersecurity.  
 
 
Figure 1: Martin-Morich Model 
 
2.1 The Determinants of Habitual Behavior 
 
Habits are automatic behaviors that are activated 
by cues in a stable context independent of goals and 
intentions. They are pre-potent, quick to activate, do 
not require conscious intervention, and are persistent 
[7]. The Martin-Morich model posits a dynamic 
process where the conscious and unconscious minds 
both participate in guiding decisions and behavior. 
Decisions and behaviors that are made repeatedly in 
stable contexts become increasingly habitual. 
Decisions and behaviors that are novel or occur in 
situations that are not familiar are more heavily 
influenced by the conscious mind. The model is 
designed to more closely reflect real world 
experiences where habitual behaviors can be 
disrupted by something that gets the attention of the 
conscious mind, and even highly complex behaviors 
can become habitual with sufficient repetitions.  
Because the model describes a dynamic process, 
there is not a clear beginning or end. Behaviors under 
analysis might be new or ongoing for years. The 
model is designed to describe the process by which 
behavior becomes habitual over time and how it is 
possible to disrupt established habits.  In the next few 
sections we provide an explanation of the tenets of 
the model.  
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2.1.1 Level of Automation 
 
Behavior is the culmination of a complex 
interplay between conscious and unconscious mental 
processes. The Martin-Morich model places behavior 
along a continuum of habit formation, with fully 
conscious behavior (pilot mode) on one end, and 
completely automatic behavior (autopilot mode) on 
the other. Between these extremes are heuristics (co-
pilot mode) where simple rules govern behavior in 
familiar situations with multiple plausible behavioral 
responses. Contrary to human perception, most 
behavior is generated from the autopilot side of the 
spectrum [8].  
It is important to understand the intensity of the 
habitual behavior under study to comprehend the risk 
profile for violating cybersecurity policies and 
procedures. Behavior that leads to high levels of 
habituation will inadvertently create greater security 
risks. 
 
2.1.2 Pilot Mode 
 
Pilot mode describes behaviors that are entirely or 
largely under the influence of the conscious mind. 
Pilot mode is engaged in novel situations where 
established behavioral repertoires do not exist and in 
situations that are highly important, highly salient, or 
highly risky.  
To engage in conscious thought requires effort, 
and the conscious mind fatigues rapidly. This is a 
primary flaw in most security assumptions. There is a 
pervasive naïve presumption that users will follow 
security practices if they understand them, and if 
punishments are in place if they do not. “The 
defining feature of System 2 (the conscious mind) is 
that its operations are effortful, and one of its main 
characteristics is laziness….” [9]. It is this laziness 
that causes the conscious mind to shift familiar tasks 
to the unconscious mind as quickly as possible. 
A good cybersecurity example of this is 
passwords. Rules for passwords include not using the 
same password for multiple accounts and not using 
easy to remember passwords. In other words, 
passwords are designed to work against the way the 
brain works. Predictably, the most frequent calls to 
IT help lines is forgotten passwords [10]. Due to this 
reason, employees also have a tendency to share 
passwords in a team setting [11]. However, that is 
due to not only the password being difficult to recall, 
but due to an element of trust that exists as being part 
of a team [12]. 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Co-pilot 
 
Co-pilot mode describes behaviors that have been 
repeated in stable environments but introduce 
conditional changes. For example, at the grocery 
store a shopper might develop a heuristic to stock up 
when a particular item goes on sale. Heuristics are 
quite common in working with information systems 
as users develop shortcuts based on varying 
responses from programs, devices and other users. 
Most users receive a large volume of emails every 
day and unconsciously develop heuristics about 
which emails get responses. For example, an 
employee may reply to an email in an order that is 
dependent on who sent it. An urgent email from a 
supervisor may dictate first response, whereas 
messages from unidentifiable resources may be 
deleted. In this scenario, an attacker may assume that 
an employee has certain heuristics, and therefore may 
create a message that spoofs a supervisor. 
The conscious and unconscious minds work 
together to solve innumerable tasks throughout the 
day. Heuristics are simplified decision sets that can 
be described as the conscious mind intervening 
minimally to perform an action that is familiar. 
Heuristics also represent a threat to security because 
the conscious mind may not be sufficiently engaged 
to properly understand the security implications of a 
given behavior. For example, people in buildings that 
require badges to unlock doors might hold open the 
door for a woman, an elderly person, or someone 
with their hands full.  
 
2.1.4 Autopilot 
 
Autopilot mode represents behaviors that are 
repeated automatically without the need for 
conscious involvement. The transition from 
conscious to unconscious action can be seen in 
learning to type, where the conscious mind is at first 
heavily taxed, but quickly shifts learning of finger 
placement to the unconscious. The conscious mind 
thinks the word, the unconscious mind types. Once 
learned, the user’s typing speed is negatively 
impacted by the intrusion of the conscious mind, as 
when a user looks at the keyboard. 
Autopilot mode works outside of conscious 
awareness, and its workings are not available to 
conscious introspection. This means that a user may 
perform a behavior unknowingly that violates a 
policy that they understand and agree with. An 
example of this is Microsoft’s Windows operating 
system. In attempting to make Windows more secure, 
the designers forced users to click an “allow” button 
before tasks that might open up the computer to 
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intrusion. But the ‘allow’ button was activated for 
numerous routine permissions, causing acceptance to 
become unconscious. This new habit defeats the 
purpose and effectiveness of this cybersecurity 
solution.  
The unconscious mind works automatically and 
effortlessly; a user cannot turn it off. This means to a 
large degree even when someone is consciously 
interacting with an information system, there is still a 
significant amount of information being processed by 
the unconscious mind. Often what the user might 
describe as a Pilot decision is simply the conscious 
mind accepting a decision presented by the habitual 
mind. Moreover, because the conscious mind 
requires will and effort, it exhausts rapidly. Expecting 
users to remain consciously vigilant in highly 
contextualized environments is unrealistic. 
Habits form in stable contexts; situations that 
become familiar through unchanging repetition—like 
most workspaces. Established contexts signals the 
conscious brain that it does not have to pay attention; 
that routines that have worked before can be executed 
without conscious mind attention. Anyone who 
works in front of a computer screen for hours at a 
time, looking at the same programs, the same walls, 
sitting in the same chair for hours a day forms a 
uniquely powerful context. This is the central 
challenge to all efforts at cybersecurity; the very 
nature of working with PCs and programs puts 
people in highly habit-forming contexts. Considering 
that one of the greatest threats an organization faces 
is from insiders [13], employees in a highly 
contextualized environment may be so used to 
sharing their passwords with team mates, that may 
inadvertently share it with someone who they initially 
may not have trusted. Password sharing continues to 
be a serious issue even though security education and 
training campaigns are carried out by organizations 
on a regular basis [14].  
 
2.1.5 Cues 
 
Cues are stimuli that have become triggers of 
habitual behavior in contextualized situations. The 
human brain is inundated with millions of stimuli, the 
vast majority of which are not processed by the 
conscious mind. However, when a behavior becomes 
closely associated with a context, specific stimuli 
become cues that trigger that behavior, such as 
responding instantly to an email. Cues are often built 
into information systems to create a desired behavior, 
such as a distinct sound to alert the user that a task 
needs to be performed. Once users become trained to 
automatically respond to a cue, they may respond to 
that cue inappropriately. A common example of this 
would be to absent-mindedly click on a link [15] that 
could be a part of a phishing campaign. However, as 
explained in the autopilot section, it is the 
unconscious mind that is ultimately making that 
decision. Vishwanath et al. [16] suggested that 
habitual patterns of IT interactions with high levels of 
email load influenced an individual’s likelihood of 
being phished. 
 
2.1.6 Feedback 
 
Feedback is anything that occurs after a behavior 
has the potential to be viewed as a consequence of 
that behavior. Outcomes that increase the likelihood 
that a behavior will be repeated are termed 
reinforcing. Those that make a behavior less likely to 
occur are termed punishing. This is how the 
unconscious mind learns, by associating an act with a 
result. The closer in time between action and 
feedback, the more powerful the association [17]. 
Generally speaking the purpose of security policies is 
to ensure compliance via a feedback mechanism [18]. 
Though this technique has worked in the past, in the 
mobile cloud computing environment cybersecurity 
compliance continues to be a major concern [19]. 
Velte et al. [20] specified the ease of working in the 
cloud computing environment due to a plethora of 
applications [20]. However, in an organization setting 
regardless of convenience, security of mobile based 
cloud applications is a concern [21]. Delays between 
a request and feedback can be especially problematic 
as it would impact the user experience and later use 
of applications. [22]. The role of habit in this setting 
was highlighted by Venkatesh, et al. [23]) who found 
that, after 3 months using an IS, the only significant 
predictor of later use was prior use; other factors 
were insignificant. It has also been stated that there is 
a correlation between ease of use of a system and 
habit formation [24]. 
 
3. Testing Environment and Results 
 
We had an opportunity to pilot test our concept in a 
controlled environment. This section provides a 
description of the environment and the results. 
 
3.1 Experimental Procedure 
 
We designed a virtual environment for each 
participant. The participant side incorporated 
Windows and Linux desktop environments with a 
web server and a self-contained email system. We 
also used a separate virtual environment that housed 
goPhish, which is an open source phishing 
framework. At no point did the participants interact 
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with the goPhish environment. Each participant was 
tasked with certain exercises that were considered to 
be a part of their work. These tasks included 
conducting online searches related to work events 
and reviewing memos about new work policies.  
Some tasks requested sending related emails to help 
simulate an employee interacting with their inbox. 
While those tasks were being carried out, we sent 
multiple phishing attempts. The first attempt was for 
a participant to reset their password by providing 
their existing password. The second focused on them 
updating their health benefits and logging into a 
single sign-on system The third email highlighted a 
merger between their company and another one, 
whereby requiring some personal information. The 
fourth and last phishing attempt asked each 
participant to use their Gmail account to enable 
access to the new single sign-on system. 
Before interacting with the email system, 
participants underwent an informed consent 
procedure where they knew their email habits would 
be monitored using a suite of neurophysiological 
tools.  Then, they were fitted with an electrode cap 
for recording their brainwaves and participated in 
calibration of an eye tracker where the first two 
participants used eye tracking glasses and the second 
two used a remote eye tracking system, both 
developed by Tobii (www.tobii.com).   
During the participant’s interaction with the email 
system, sixteen channels of EEG were recorded using 
the research-grade BioSemi Active Two bioamplifier 
system (http://www.cortechsolutions.com/Products/ 
Physiological-data-acquisition/Systems/ 
ActiveTwo.aspx) connected to a PC. The electrode 
cap was configured according to the widely used 10-
20 system of electrode placement [25].  Active 
electrodes were placed on the cap to allow for the 
recording of brain activations down-sampled at 256 
Hz using a Common Average Reference (CAR).  The 
sixteen recorded channels were: frontal-polar (Fp1, 
Fp2), frontal-central (FC3, FCz, FC4), central (C3, 
Cz, C4), temporal-parietal (TP7, TP8), parietal (P3, 
Pz, P4), and occipital (O1, Oz, O2).  
In addition to EEG and eye tracking data, we also 
recorded the small muscular movements in the face 
using a web camera to detect emotion, cursor 
movements and mouse-clicks, and all audio and 
video of the interaction through the iMotions 
software suite for syncing biometric data 
(www.imotions.com).  At the end, participants were 
given a brief survey to collect basic demographic 
information and inquire about their risk propensity 
and computer playfulness.  Each session lasted about 
an hour. 
 
3.2 Sample 
 
We had six participants as summarized in Table 1.  
There were 3 males and 3 females with an average 
age of 37 years and all except one with 10-15 or more 
years of work experience.  Participants 1 and 2 
worked for over five years within the IT field and 
were currently working within the field, whereas 
Participants 3 and 4 were non-IT workers.  
Participant 3 was working as a leadership and 
communications coach for undergraduate students, 
Participant 4 was working as a graduate research 
assistant in BioChemistry and was a former high 
school Chemistry teacher, and Participant 5 was an 
office business manager.  Although Participant 6 was 
the youngest participant, he had relevant IT work 
experience. 
 
Table 1: Participant Demographics 
No. Gender Age Field 
1 M 39 IT 
2 F 41 IT 
3 M 37 Non-IT 
4 F 44 Non-IT 
5 F 36 Non-IT 
6 M 22 IT 
 
These individuals were purposive sampled to 
represent males and females within a more mature 
age range from IT and from outside of the IT field 
and hence arguably less familiar with security 
protocols.  These individuals should not have 
experienced cognitive decline associated with aging 
and yet were old enough that their brains had settled 
into a stable level of myelination indicative of 
matured brain function.  Further, studies have shown 
that younger individuals are inherently riskier [26], a 
bias we wished to avoid. 
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
The goPhish dashboard provided us with all 
information that the participants were entering in 
their virtual environment. Figure 2 provides an 
overview of the results for Participant 1. As the 
figure shows, we were able to track if a participant 
not only opened an email, but also if they clicked any 
of the links, or submitted any data. 
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Figure 2: Participant 1 
 
It was interesting to note that even though they had 
expertise in IT, Participants 1 and 2 fell for all 
phishing campaigns. Participant 3 as the figure below 
shows, opened the emails, but did not click any of the 
links, nor did he provide any information. We later 
discovered that he had just conducted his annual 
security training within two weeks of participation; 
the training was still salient in his mind of what were 
legitimate emails and not, indicated by statements 
such as, “Trying to get me to go to my personal 
Gmail... That dog won’t hunt!” and with further 
reflection, “Corporate wanting me to go to Gmail was 
really sketchy.” 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Participant 3 
 
Participant 4 on the other hand as the figure shows, 
did click on all the links that were part of the 
phishing campaign and provided information for the 
password reset and financial information update.  She 
seemed to sense things were going awry for her 
behavior saying at the end, “I’m sorta feeling like this 
guy at the end, a sucker [emphasized with laughter].” 
 
 
Figure 4: Participant 4 
 
Figures 5 and 6 reflect the actions of our final two 
participants. 
 
Figure 5: Participant 5 
 
 
Figure 6: Participant 6 
 
Participant 5 as the Figure above shows, did not click 
on any of the phishing attempts, where as our final 
participant did fall for the financial information 
gathering phishing attempt. 
Recordings from the sixteen channels of scalp 
electrodes were analyzed offline using a previously-
validated technique for brain localization and 
associated software: standardized low resolution 
brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) [27].  
This analysis was conducted for each of the six 
participants.  Figure 5 presents topological plots of 
neural activations across participants’ scalps analyzed 
for the duration of their activity.  These activations 
are presented on a fixed scale such that brighter areas 
with yellow indicate highest levels of activation.  For 
each grouping of topological plots, the image on the 
top row in the center is a back-end view of the brain 
whereas the image on the bottom row in the center is 
a front-on view of the brain (with the view indicated 
in small font in the bottom right corner).  Among 
other things, higher activation in the left hemisphere 
may indicate stronger positive approach to the 
activity whereas higher activation in the right 
hemisphere may indicate negative approach to the 
activity [28].   
The topological plots are all rather different with 
the exception of Participants 1 and 4 with greatest 
activation in their prefrontal cortex, an area that has 
been associated with decision making and planning 
complex behaviors.  Yet these participants are rather 
different in individual characteristics.  Participant 1 is 
male with many years of IT experience and familiar 
with virtual environments and security procedures, 
and Participant 4 is female and self-described as non-
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astute with technology.  The cognitive difference 
between these individuals is that Participant 1 shows 
greater activity on the right hemisphere of his frontal 
lobe indicating conscious thinking about his actions 
and judgement of the activities while perhaps 
reflecting the frustration he felt with the technical 
environment and its slow performance.  Participant 4 
may also have this conscious-level of thinking about 
the activity but she was laughing at herself 
throughout and this degree of self-amusement may be 
the slight hemispheric difference shown favoring the 
left hemisphere. 
Participant 2 had greatest activation in her 
occipital lobe associated with visual processing.  She 
made statements like, “I just could look at my inbox 
and see that I didn’t need to click on any of those 
emails.”  Unfortunately, this statement is not in line 
with her actions as she did in fact click on them.  This 
is where analysis of her qualitative statements may 
point to her clicking on emails to verify her notions 
rather than actually falling for the campaign which 
would be indicated by her dashboard report.  The 
lack of frontal lobe activity may indicate the neural 
efficiency of an expert as her role is to educate and 
secure networks at her job.  Further, a positive 
approach to the activity is indicated by greater 
activation in the left hemisphere and was reinforced 
by her smiling through the activity. 
The EEG results of Participant 3 are interesting in 
the context of the study because the greatest 
activation appears in the superior frontal gyrus of the 
frontal lobe, an area associated with higher cognitive 
functions such as working memory.  It is possible 
that his brain topography is a reflection of him trying 
to recall what he was typing in an email because the 
system crashed on him while he was composing 
emails before he had an opportunity to save them as 
drafts which he verbalized to researchers. 
Participants 5 and 6 had greatest activation in 
their frontal lobe but in different areas; Participant 5 
had greatest activation in her inferior temporal gyrus 
(a.k.a. the IT cortex but not because of an association 
with information technology) whereas Participant 6 
had greatest activation in his middle frontal gyrus.  
The IT cortex is associated with processing visual 
stimuli and matching of color and form.  This 
participant seemed to be more engrossed with a 
particular task to identify t-shirts for a work function.  
Contrastingly, the middle frontal gyrus is associated 
with attention.  Particularly, the right middle frontal 
gyrus, as is highlighted for Participant 6, has been 
tied to numeracy or the ability to conduct numerical 
operations [29]. Here we may be seeing evidence of 
this participant’s difficulty in keeping track of which 
task he was on as he was observed repeatedly 
shuffling the task papers and verifying that he had 
conducted the earlier tasks. 
 
Participant 1 
 
 
Participant 2 
 
 
Participant 3 
 
Participant 4 
 
 
Participant 5 
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Participant 6 
 
 
Scale 
 
 
Figure 5: Topological Plots of EEG 
Activations for Participants 
Figure 6 illustrates results that may be obtained from 
eye tracking to generate heatmaps of a participant’s 
attention.  These heatmaps show similar patterns for 
Participants 1 and 2 scanning the Inbox with their 
eyes and yet this contrasts with how they were 
mentally processing the experience.  Further, eye 
tracking allows us to confirm engagement with the 
interface.  In addition to EEG and eye tracking data, 
we were able to obtain stimulus-synced assessments 
of emotion ranging from joy to anger based on facial 
encoding of slight muscular movements recorded by 
web camera.  We do not report here the results of 
these additionally-edifying measures to instead focus 
on the richness that EEG may provide to a study. 
 
  
Figure 6: Heatmaps Generated from Eye 
Tracking Data of Participants 1 (left) and 2 
(right) Viewing the Email Inbox 
 
Further reflection indicates that EEG may be 
triangulated with emotion, eye tracking, screen 
capture, survey, and qualitative debrief to more fully 
understand a person’s experience while engaging 
with a phishing campaign.  Context of the session, 
individual characteristics, and personal account of 
mental processing are all necessary to better 
understand such varied results as may be obtained 
using biometric tools.  This variation in human 
mental processing is illustrated by the brain 
activations of the six participants who themselves 
vary.  Yet we may better understand the impact of 
SETA programs with these tools providing richer 
insights to their thought processes and behavior.  
With further study, we may see trends across 
individual characteristics and experiences and better 
target interventions. 
 
3.4 Participant Survey 
 
Experiment participants completed a short 
survey, which asked them about their general risk 
perceptions, computer playfulness, and specific risk 
perception. 
For general risk perceptions, participants were 
asked to indicate 1, 2 or 3 where 1=During most of 
my life, I found dangerous or risky situations 
exhilarating and was willing to give up some control 
for the thrill. 2=During most of my life, I found some 
danger or risk exciting, but only if I had control of 
the situation. 3=During most of my life, I have 
avoided risky situations because I believe that it is 
better to be safe than sorry.  The mean for pilot 
participants was 2.5. 
Computer playfulness was measured using a 1-7 
Likert style scale where 1 represents Not at All and 7 
represents All the Way.  The questions asked 
participants how they would characterize themselves 
when they use microcomputers.  When presented 
with specific adjectives, they chose 1-7 to match the 
description of themselves when interacting with 
microcomputers.  Table 2 shows the Mean for the 
responses. 
 
Table 2: Computer Playfulness Response 
Means 
 Adjective Mean 
Spontaneous 3.25 
Unimaginative 3.75 
Flexible 6.25 
Creative 5.25 
Playful 4.5 
Unoriginal 3.25 
Uninventive 3.25 
 
Finally, participants were asked to indicate one 
of the following measures of specific risk that we 
developed to measure risk perception in this study. 
1=I believe that the overall riskiness of the Email 
system is very high. 2=I believe that the overall 
riskiness of the Email system is very low.  The mean 
for participants was 1.5. 
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4. The Maturation of our Model Toward 
a Specific Training Platform 
 
There is an emergent model out of this research 
that is shown in Figure 7. The model is based on the 
following premise. As mentioned earlier, the key 
dependent variable of interest is the actual behavior 
of the individual. Here the actual behavior relates to 
whether an individual fell for a phishing attack or 
not. Based on our research and literature, we argue 
for the following model. The model is shown as an 
input-process-output model.  
The key inputs into the model are the actual work 
task being performed by an individual, which in our 
case was answering office emails. The actual work 
task relates to individual performance. The task 
complexity in this case would be rated as medium. 
The threat is as it relates to the anomaly in the 
individual’s task that may result in an information 
security breach. In the case of our study, this related 
to the phishing attempt designed by the researcher.  
As individuals went through the process of doing 
their tasks, two key variables that influenced actions 
were the risk perception of an individual and the 
cognitive load experienced by the individual. The 
neuroscience-based approach illustrated in this paper 
suggests that there may be a difference between how 
people act and what is going on in their minds. Based 
on this research, we suggest the following 
propositions: 
 
P1: The greater the novelty of the threat, the greater 
the risk perception of the task.  
 
P2: The more complicated the task, the more 
cognitive load it presents. 
 
P3: The greater the risk perception, the greater the 
likelihood the individual’s actions will be secure.  
 
P4: The greater the cognitive load, the less likely the 
actions of an individual will be secure.  
 
More broadly, the emergent model argues that the 
focus of security training needs to incorporate both 
the threat novelty and task complexity. Those are the 
key determinants of cognitive load that in turn lead to 
secure behavioral actions. 
 
Security Threat 
Novelty
Task Complexity Cognitive load
Risk Perception
Secure Behavior 
action
P1 +
P2 +
P3 -
P4 -
Training Focus Psychological Process Outcome
 
Figure 7: Emergent Model 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Email is still one of the most widely used tools in 
the workforce to communicate and collaborate. 
Hence it is crucial that employees know how to 
identify and avoid phishing emails as the best way to 
thwart a phishing attack. The pilot test presented 
here, simulated an aspect of a regular day at the 
office to see what a person experienced while 
interacting with their email inbox and working 
through tasks, how their brain was affected, and the 
emotions experienced. Neurophysiological tools 
helped illustrate the thought processes behind 
participants’ statements and actions; combined with 
consideration of individual characteristics, these tools 
may help shed more light on human behavior.  
Getting a full view of the lived experience of a 
person during a phishing attack may prove helpful in 
advancing the effectiveness of SETA programs.  This 
study seems to give credence to the notion that 
proximity of training to engagement with a phishing 
campaign may have the most influence on the level 
of awareness and success that a person has in 
successfully resisting a phishing campaign.  In future 
work, we will expand the testing environment to 
incorporate the emergent model presented here and 
expand the sample population to industry 
professionals with a range of IT and non-IT 
experience. 
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